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DLD-037

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 22-1438
___________
TERRELL MARSHALL,
Appellant
v.
NELSON ANTHONY IANNUZZI;
HARESH PANDYA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-20-cv-00489)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 22, 2022
Before: JORDAN, SHWARTZ, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed December 7, 2022)
_________
OPINION*
_________
PER CURIAM

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Terrell Marshall appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motion for
summary judgment. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm the District
Court’s judgment.
The procedural history of this case and the details of Marshall’s claims are well
known to the parties, set forth in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation,
and need not be discussed at length. Briefly, on April 1, 2018, Marshall, a state prisoner,
sustained an injury to his calf and was given crutches and Motrin by a nurse. Appellee
Iannuzzi, a certified registered nurse practitioner, examined him the next day,
recommended ice and Motrin, and scheduled daily monitoring by the nursing staff.
Marshall had pain and swelling which increased. On April 7, Appellee Dr. Pandya sent
Marshall out to a hospital for an ultrasound. After a blood clot was discovered, Marshall
was prescribed anticoagulants and returned to prison. On April 12, Dr. Pandya sent
Marshall back to the hospital for a follow-up ultrasound which showed more clots and a
hematoma. Marshall returned to the prison and was scheduled to see Dr. Pandya the next
day. Later that night, however, Marshall suffered from shortness of breath and was
spitting up blood-tinged mucus. Dr. Pandya ordered that he be taken to a hospital via an
ambulance. At the hospital, Marshall underwent emergency surgery on his leg and two
follow-up surgeries. Marshall subsequently filed a civil rights complaint alleging that
Iannuzzi and Dr. Pandya had been deliberately indifferent and negligent in their treatment
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of his leg injury. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment. After the District
Court granted the motion, Marshall filed a notice of appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order granting summary judgment de novo and review the facts in the light most
favorable to Marshall as the nonmoving party. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163,
170 (3d Cir. 2011). A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals
that “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The District Court thoroughly described the factual background of the case and
Marshall’s allegations against the Appellees. We agree with its analysis and write here to
discuss Marshall’s arguments on appeal.
Eighth Amendment claims
In order to establish a claim under the Eighth Amendment for denial of medical
care, Marshall needed to show that the Appellees were deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976). A medical need
is serious if it is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or
one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s
attention.” Monmouth Cty Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir.
1987) (citation omitted). Deliberate indifference can be shown by a prison official
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“intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with
the treatment once prescribed.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05. Mere disagreement as to the
proper medical treatment will not support a claim under the Eighth Amendment, see
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004), and courts will “disavow any attempt
to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of treatment . . . (which)
remains a question of sound professional judgment.” Inmates of Allegheny Jail v. Pierce,
612 F. 2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted, alteration in original).
Marshall has not shown that Iannuzzi or Dr. Pandya intentionally denied or
delayed any medical care. While he believed he should have been sent to an outside
hospital sooner than he was, he has offered nothing to suggest that Appellees’ treatment
decisions were not based on their professional judgment or violated any professional
standard of care. Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017)
(“[W]hen medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner is proper
absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.”).
On appeal, Marshall argues that he is not challenging the delay in treatment but
rather the denial of treatment. However, he was provided with ice, Motrin, crutches, pain
medication, blood thinners, the opportunity to be checked by nurses three times a day,
ultrasounds, and ultimately, surgery. Marshall has failed to show that there is a genuine
dispute as to any material fact regarding his claims of deliberate indifference.
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State law claims
Marshall also challenges the District Court’s grant of summary judgment with
respect to his state-law claims against Appellees. The District Court determined that
those claims required expert evidence to support them because whether Appellees’
treatment of Marshall rose to the level of malpractice was not within the knowledge of an
average layperson. Because Marshall submitted no such expert evidence, the District
Court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate. See generally Pa. R. Civ. P.
1042.3(a).
On appeal, Marshall first argues that expert evidence is not required for the claims
against Iannuzzi because, as a certified registered nurse practitioner, he is not a licensed
professional. However, under Pennsylvania law, a “licensed professional” includes
nurses. See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1042.1(c)(1)(vii). Rule 1042.1 refers to the Professional
Nursing Law which, in turn, defines a “certified registered nurse practitioner” as a
registered nurse licensed in this Commonwealth who is certified by the board in a
particular clinical specialty area. See 63 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 212(12). Thus, Iannuzzi is a
licensed professional.
Marshall also contends that Iannuzzi’s alleged negligence was clear because he
told Iannuzzi that he heard a “pop” and the average person knows that this is indicative of
a tear in the muscle. Marshall contends that no expert evidence is necessary to establish
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that. We disagree. Such purported knowledge is not within the ken of the average
person. See generally McCool v. Dep’t of Corr., 984 A.2d 565, 571 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2009) (explaining that “generally when the complexities of the human body are involved
expert testimony is required to aid the jury in reaching conclusions as to the cause of pain
or injury” (quoting Wareham v. Jeffes, 564 A.2d 1314, 1321 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989)).
The District Court did not err in granting Appellees’ motion for summary
judgment. Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in
the appeal. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See 3d Cir. I.O.P.
10.6. Appellant’s motion for a certificate of appealability is denied as unnecessary. See
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (describing appeals which require a certificate of appealability).
We have, however, considered the arguments therein.
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